A new threshold scheme for the Digital Signature Standard is proposed using Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem. The proposed scheme is simple and can be used practically in real life.
Introduction
Threshold cryptography deals with the problem of sharing a highly sensitive secret among a group of n users so that only when a sufficient number t of them come together can the secret be reconstructed. This problem is known as the secret sharing problem and several secret sharing schemes (SSS) have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [1, 2, 8] ).
Another problem threshold cryptography deals with is the function sharing problem. A function sharing scheme (FSS) requires distributing the function's computation according to the underlying SSS such that each part of the computation can be carried out by a different user and then the partial results can be combined to yield the function's value without disclosing individual secrets. All FSSs in the literature, e.g., [3, 4, 7, 9] , proposed for various cryptosystems have traditionally used Shamir's SSS [8] until a recent work by Kaya and Selçuk [6] which showed how to use the Asmuth-Bloom SSS (AB-SSS [1] for function sharing.
The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) is the current U.S. standard for digital signatures. Sharing DSS is an interesting problem and a neat solution was given by Gennaro et al. [5] based on Shamir's SSS. Here we give an alternative solution for this problem based on a modified version of the Asmuth-Bloom SSS (AB-SSS).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 and 3, we describe the Digital Signature Standard and the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme, respectively. In Section 4, the threshold DSS scheme based on the Asmuth-Bloom SSS is proposed. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Digital Signature Standard:
The DSS is summarized below:
• Key Generation Phase: Let p and q be large prime numbers where q|p − 1 and g ∈ Z * p be an element of order q. The private key α ∈ R Z * q is chosen randomly and the public key β = g α mod p is computed.
• Signing Phase: The signer first chooses a random ephemeral key k ∈ R Z * q and then computes the signature (r, s) where
for a hashed message w ∈ Z q .
• Verification Phase: The signature (r, s) is verified by checking
where s −1 is computed in Z * q .
Asmuth-Bloom Secret Sharing Scheme
The phases of the Asmuth-Bloom SSS are described below:
• Dealer Phase: Let d be the secret to be shared, n be the number of users, and t be the threshold value. Let m 0 < m 1 < m 2 < . . . < m n be relatively prime integers such that d < m 0 and
(see [6] for a detailed discussion). Let M denote t i=1 m i . The dealer computes y = d + Am 0 where A is a random positive integer such that y < M . The share of the ith user is y i = y mod m i .
• Combiner Phase: Let S be a coalition of t users gathered to construct the secret.
Let M S denote i∈S m i .
-Let M S\{i} denote j∈S,j =i m j and M S,i be the multiplicative inverse of
First, the ith user computes
-The users first compute
and then obtain the secret d by computing
We will use the notation d t ↔ (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) to denote a (t, n)-SSS with secret d and shares {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n }.
Arithmetic Properties of the Asmuth-Bloom SSS
Suppose multiple secrets are shared with common parameters t, n, and moduli m i s. The shareholders can use the following properties to obtain new shares for the sum and product of the shared secrets.
be secrets shared by AB-SSS with common parameters t, n, and moduli m i s, for some < m 0 . Let y ij be the share of the ith user for secret 
Sharing DSS
To obtain a threshold DSS scheme, first the dealer generates the private key α and shares it among the users by (t, n) AB-SSS with m 0 = q. Then a signing coalition S can sign a message in a threshold fashion without requiring a trusted party. Note that anyone can forge signatures if he knows k for a valid signature (r, s). Hence, r = (g k −1 mod p) mod q must be computed in a way that no one obtains k. Here, we first explain the necessary primitives that will be used to solve this problem and then describe the overall threshold signature scheme together. Below, S denotes the signing coalition of size 2t + 2.
Joint Random Secret Sharing
In a joint random secret sharing (Joint-RSS) scheme, each user in the signing coalition S contributes something to the secret generation process and obtains a share for the resulting random secret as described below:
1. Each user j ∈ S chooses a random secret d j ∈ Z m 0 and shares it as d j t ↔ (y 1j , y 2j , · · · , y nj ) where y ij is the share of the ith user.
The ith user computes y
i = ( n j=1 y ij ) mod m i . By Proposition 1, d t+1 ↔ (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) is a valid SSS for d = ( n i=1 d i ) mod m 0 assuming n < m 0 .
Computing g d mod p
In DSS, we need to share and compute g d mod p for a joint random secret d. Here we give a scheme, Joint-Exp-RSS, to construct an approximate value for g d mod p. This approximate value will later be corrected through a separate correction process.
1. Use Joint-RSS to generate and share a secret d as d t+1 ↔ (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ). Let S ⊂ S be a coalition of size t + 1 that wants to compute f d = g d mod p.
Each user
i ∈ S computes u i,d = (y i M S \{i} M S ,i ) mod M S where M S ,i is the inverse of M S \{i} mod m i , and broadcasts f i,d = g u i,d mod p.
The approximate value for
Observe that d = (( i∈S u i ) mod M S ) mod q whereas this construction process computes f d = g d mod p for d = i∈S u i mod q. Since there are t + 1 users in S and
Computing
In DSS, we need to compute r = g k −1 mod p in such a way that neither k nor k −1 is known by any user. The following Joint-Exp-Inverse procedure computes r without revealing k: 1. S uses Joint-RSS to jointly share random secrets k t+1 ↔ (k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k n ) and a t+1 ↔ (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) and constructs v = ak from shares
and broadcasts f i,a = g u i,a mod p. The approximate value is computed as
for some a = a + δ a M S , 0 ≤ δ a ≤ t. S corrects f a through the following correction procedure:
(a) Let S ⊂ S be a set of t + 1 users. Each user i ∈ S computes
and finds the (j a = δ a , j k = δ k ) pair that satisfies this equality. Once δ a is found f a = g a mod p = f a g −δaM S mod p can be computed.
The signing coalition S computes
The (j a , j k ) pair, 0 ≤ j a , j k ≤ t, found for (1) is unique with overwhelming probability given that (t + 1) 2 q.
Threshold DSS Scheme
The phases of the proposed threshold DSS scheme are as follows:
• Key Generation Phase: Let α ∈ R Z * q be the private signature key. The dealer sets m 0 = q and shares α t ↔ (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n ).
• Signing Phase: To sign a hashed message w ∈ Z q , the signing coalition S of size 2t + 2 first computes r = (g k −1 mod p) mod q by Joint-Exp-Inverse. To compute s = k(w + rα) mod q, each user i ∈ S computes s i = k i (w + rα i ) mod m i .
Since α is shared (t, n), the value y = α + A α m 0 is less than M . Hence, w + ry < m 0 + m 0 y < (m 0 + 1)M and a coalition of size t + 1 is sufficient to compute w + ry and obtain w + rα mod q. Since the threshold for secret k is also t + 1, by Proposition 3, s 2t+2 ↔ (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) and s is computed by 2t + 2 partial signatures.
• Verification Phase is the same as the standard DSS verification.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated how to share the signing function used in the Digital Signature Standard by using the Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme. We proposed a t-out-of-n threshold signature scheme based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
